Roland Watson, firstname.lastname@example.org
ISIS REPORT ON
BURMAS NUCLEAR PROGRAM
January 31, 2010
report from ISIS - the Institute for Science and International Security, on
the putative involvement of Burma's military junta, the SPDC, in nuclear proliferation.
The report's breadth and precision are greatly appreciated. The information on
the computer-controlled machine tools, Namchongang, and New East, is very valuable.
would like to know, though, which companies from Germany, Switzerland and Japan
exported the machine tools to Burma, and what specific machines were involved.)
the report mentions me and Dictator Watch, I have a few other comments/clarifications:
all "evidence" about the SPDC's nuclear program has been made public.
is a bit strong to say that we "claimed" that the Myit Nge River site
was a uranium mine and mill. If you look at the Dictator
Watch photo essay, I used the verb "suspected." I noted that the
mine could be a quarry for construction materials, and was aware of the cement
facility possibility for the nearby mill. But, I also secured the opinion of an
academic who is a uranium expert, who said that from the images one couldn't be
sure what the facility was for, and that uranium milling couldn't be ruled out.
put the images out in the hopes that someone would conclusively identify the facility's
It is also important to note that it was under construction at
the time. Further, information about this site came from a different channel than
our other intelligence.
I would say, however, that the photo ISIS located
of the Chinese team at the site is definitive. This is likely the facility that
is producing the cement for Naypyidaw, including its tunnels.
defectors, the ISIS report is unclear.
"Dictator Watch head Roland
Watson claims that much of Ball and Thortons information was published earlier
by Dictator Watch, relying on the same defectors."
closing clause of this statement, there have been three defectors that we are
aware of, at least as of last summer. Ball and Thornton published the source they
called Moe Jo, whom we previously had published, but without identification. They
also had Tayza's accountant, who they called Tin Min.
Our reports are based
on Moe Jo, the other, third defector, and other sources as well.
about the SPDC's program that we believe are important but that are not being
given sufficient attention:
- The extent of the nuclear facilities in the
Thabeikkyin area. (We haven't been able to locate satellite imagery for these
facilities, although we are confident that they are there.)
- The bartering
of yellowcake by the SPDC. (The ISIS article, quoting a European intelligence
official, denies the milling of yellowcake - our sources disagree.)
acquisition by the SPDC of North Korean SRBMs.
- What really happened with
the NK cargo flight that recently landed in Bangkok, and what was the full manifest
for the 35 tons of cargo. (We received a report - we stress that it is unconfirmed
- that the flight was bound for Burma but that U.S. jets forced it to enter Thai
airspace after which Thai jets forced it to land. If this is true, the shipment
could have been a second attempt to deliver the cargo carried by the Kang Nam
1 freighter last summer.)
- The acquisition by the SPDC of nuclear weapon
components, along the lines described in the recent revelation by the Washington
Post that China supplied enough enriched uranium for two atomic bombs to Pakistan
- Why the U.S. won't publish the JADE Act Section 10 Report on
Military and Intelligence Aid to Burma. The first edition of this annual report
was never made public, contrary to the terms of the law. We are now entering the
second year for which it is due. (The ISIS report should have mentioned this.)
U.S. knows a lot more than it is saying. There is a cover-up. The ISIS policy
recommendations are based on only part of the information that the U.S. has available.